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STEPHEN GARTON* 
In 1910 Winston Churchill, then British Home Secretary, read a 
small pamphlet about recent treatments for juvenile delinquents 
in Indiana. H. C. Sharp's tract trumpeted the success he had had in 
curing juvenile degeneracy while Superintendent of the State's 
'Home for Boys'. Churchill dictated a memorandum to his 
Department suggesting that the Home Office establish a committee 
to investigate the feasibility of instituting this new treatment in 
Britain's prisons, juvenile reformatories and institutions for the 
feeble-minded. 'For my part', he claimed, 'I think it is cruel to 
shut up numbers of people in institutions ... if by a simple surgical 
operation they could be permitted to live freely in the world 
without causing much inconvenience to others'. Later he added, 
'I certainly do not look forward to that millennium for which 
some scientists appear to hanker when the majority of the human 
race will be permanently confined ... attended by numerous doctors 
and guarded by legions of warders'. Churchill's demand instigated 
a response worthy of Yes Minister. A flurry of file notes testify to 
the agitation this proposal caused in Whitehall-it wouldn't gain 
Parliamentary support, it wouldn't carry public opinion, it wouldn't 
even command, as they discovered, unanimous scientific support. 
As one file note commented 'I feel inclined to suggest minuting 
this "Bring up again on January 1, 1950"'.1 
There are a number of interesting dimensions to this episode, 
although limitations of space prevent me from pursuing. 
Churchill's preferred surgical solution, however, does point to 
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some of the complexities involved in deciphering the nature of 
eugenics and other new modes of social regulation in the early 
twentieth century. With hindsight we might also appreciate the 
irony of inventing a simple procedure, the vasectomy, to control 
the fertility of the 'unfit', becoming an important means by which 
the middle classes have controlled their own number ever since. 
But here we need to step back and see Churchill's statement 
within the context of a larger emergent political technology. The 
idea that threats to the public good could be diagnosed before 
they became social acts begins to engage lines of enquiry from 
the 1860s. From this period a range of theories, methods and 
practices begin to evolve, particularly in the area of crime and 
punishment, which shift the focus away from punishing illegal 
acts and towards treating the perpetrators of those acts. As Martin 
Wiener has argued, criminals changed from being purposive 
moral agents to being figures trapped by their nature.2 Moreover 
there was a growing confidence that these perpetrators could be 
singled out and treated long before they realised their criminal 
potential. Criminal anthropology, anthropometrics, eugenics, 
criminal psychology, forensic criminology, branches of sociology, 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis all offered related but differing 
interpretations, practices and remedies to the 'social ills' that 
afflicted modern societies.3 We might see these in turn as part 
of a larger transformation away from juridical modes of power, 
as Foucault would see them, to disciplinary and classificatory 
forms-although there is never a clear historicist rupture here, 
the different modalities mixing, conflicting and intersecting in 
complex ways throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.4 
Perhaps, over the last two decades, with the rise of discourses 
about victim's rights, the revival in America of capital punishment, 
and the popularity of policies such as 'truth in sentencing', 
mandatory sentencing, and 'three strikes and you're out' laws, 
might signify the re-emergence of older juridical forms and the 
decline of the classifying, social interventionist and psychological 
strategies of the last century. Alternatively we may be entering a 
definably new configuration of the power to punish. 
Whether we are at the end of a era of penality or not is difficult 
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to tell (putting aside the problems inherent in such an historicist 
question). Regardless of any answer, the legacy ofthe disciplinary 
and classificatory regimes of the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries have been profound; not just the vasectomy but the IQ 
test, the personality test, vocational guidance, fingerprinting, 
Bertillon measurements, profiling, indeterminate sentences, the 
case file, probation, parole, therapeutic communities and much 
more. Some have been transitory practices, others have found a 
very secure place in our society. If we return to Churchill, his 
statements have an intelligibility in a culture intensely engaged 
in debating the extent and threat of mental defectiveness, confident 
that it had the means to diagnose this affliction at an early age 
and seeking the political will to implement the implications of 
this knowledge. Segregation was politically palatable, and as a 
consequence enforced in most jurisdictions in the West, while 
sterilisation was credible and had some success in parts of Europe 
and North America, but met stronger resistance in Britain and 
Australia.5 Churchill was also writing at a time when the idea 
of the 'lethal chamber' was the topic of much polite dinner 
conversation in elite circles in London, and elsewhere in Europe, 
although only a few ventured into print.6 Perhaps one of the 
questions we should ask more often is not 'why Germany?' but 
'why not England?' 
Part of any answer to such a question involves a consideration 
of the nature, function and effect of bureaucracies. This has been 
a troubling topic for many over the years. It is one of the keys to 
understanding the work of such seminal thinkers as Weber, 
Habermas, Kafka and Hannah Arendt. While the later Habermas 
has a largely benign view of modern democratic institutions, 
including bureaucracies, as things that enhance communicative 
competence and political participation, Kafka and Arendt have 
argued for the destructi ve potential of bureaucracy.7 For 
Arendt, in particular, bureaucracy fosters totalitarian abjection, 
homogenises thought, destroys individuality and undermines 
the capacity for self-representation. Bureaucracies reduce 
communication to cliche and enable functionaries to supervise 
the unthinkable. This is what constitutes 'the banality of evil'. 8 
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Arendt's arresting formulation is part of a larger a tradition of 
political thought, one which ascribes new modes of domination 
-even radical evil-to modernity, rationality, hegemony, the 
loss of a capacity for self-reflection and morally sound action. 
Weber is also important here. What constitutes modernity is 
disenchantment, the decline of older forms of community, 
erosion of faith in magic, religion, mystery, superstition and its 
replacement by reason, rationalisation, bureaucratic process and 
science. Although diagnosing rationalisation as a major social 
force, Weber, crucially, reserved a space for something enchanted 
within modernity-charisma.9 
Let me return, once again, to Winston Churchill and 1910. He 
is writing in the context of growing confidence in the capacity of 
science to solve the problem of crime and delinquency. Science 
offered the tools to diagnose criminals and treat them before they 
committed a crime. Criminals were not so much law breakers as 
mental defectives, degenerates, atavisms, sexual perverts, deviants, 
the psychiatrically scarred, psychotic, neuropathic, the socially 
disadvantaged, the product of pathological families and a host of 
other categories grounded in psychiatric, psychological, eugenic 
and sociological discourses and practices. An ever widening and 
more complex grid of classifications and treatments came to make 
the field of social deviance intelligible. These categories, 
discourses and practices replaced older languages of the 
monstrous, evil, immorality, and exemplary punishments with 
ones of inefficiencies, diseases and treatments. 
But edging around these new scientific formulations, or perhaps 
more accurately disrupting these intelligibilities, were criminals 
who found only a very uneasy place within these frameworks. 
These were liminal figures, ones who did not quite fit. Here I 
want to focus on one of these. In early twentieth-century England 
they came to be known as moral imbeciles, in America the 
preferred term became psychopath. Here I want to try to explore 
how the monstrous and the scientific rubbed against each other in 
complex ways. It is part of a larger story of how social science 
has sought to make evil explicable. Yet despite our will to explain, 
the unfathomable keeps returning. 
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II 
It is perfectly possible to trace an evolution in the language of the 
figure who has become known as the criminal psychopath-from 
a cacophony of popular ideas and representations to the dry 
prognostications of medical witnesses and psychological experts. 
Let me take some relatively arbitrary points of contrast. The 1888 
Whitechapel or Jack the Ripper murders were captured in many 
languages-a middle class reforming discourse of 'darkest 
London'; numerous popular ones on 'the monster', 'the leather 
apron', the 'mad doctor', the 'sinister Jew', or the 'aristocratic 
libertine'; as well as scientific and quasi-scientific discourses of 
the sadist, the homicidal maniac, the monomaniac and the 
erotomaniac. 11 The proliferation is in part the product of the 
absence of an offender, allowing imagination to roam free. But 
we can see similar mixtures of discourses, popular and scientific, 
with no dominant reading, in similar cases of the period which 
did produce someone in the dock-criminals like Dr Thomas 
Cream, who poisoned four prostitutes in 1892. In the same year 
Frederick Deeming, a recent immigrant to Australia, murdered 
his wife. On further investigation police found five other bodies 
buried in his former residence in England. Some suspected 
Deeming of being 'the Ripper', a trope that returns time and 
again in popular accounts of gruesome crimes for over a century .11 
If we jump ahead to 1942, however, something has changed, 
at least at the level of meaning. In February of that year English 
serviceman Gordon Cummins was arrested for the murder and 
mutilation of four women. Dubbed by the press, by now very 
predictably, 'Jack the Ripper', we can see the continuing popular 
resonance of ideas of the monstrous. But at the level of the 
scientific, the imaginative vision has diminished. The ensemble 
of representations has narrowed, become more stable, fixed-
Cummins is a psychopath, assessed by a recognised body of 
experts, deemed to be able to differentiate right from wrong and 
therefore answerable for his crimes, found guilty and hanged. 
More significantly, while the popular and the scientific still jostled 
to describe this case in the press, the scientific has become the 
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dominant mode for serious deliberation and decision. 12 Since the 
1880s doctors had fought for, and won, a place within the criminal 
justice system-in courts, prisons and parole boards-giving them 
a privileged place in which to define criminals and their culpability. 
And in between these points we can find all sorts of variations 
and transitions, marking the gradual emergence of criminal 
psychopathology as a distinct domain of discourses and practices. 
Take, for instance, Henry Kendall Thaw, spoiled son of a family 
which made its millions from Coca Cola. At age eighteen Henry 
made his home in a New York brothel and earned a reputation for 
being too fond of whipping. In 1906 he shot and killed Standford 
White, society architect and lover of a young woman Thaw had 
fallen for, at an outdoor theatre performance. The subsequent 
trial made 'emotional insanity' the framework in which this case 
was debated. Thaw's defence counsel marshalled reputable doctors 
who defined his affliction as a case of 'dementia Americana', 
that well known syndrome whereby men strike out in murderous 
rage when a woman's honour is attacked. Found guilty but insane, 
Thaw lived in luxury in a criminal mental hospital, and was later 
'sprung' by men hired by his doting mother and driven to Canada 
in a chauffeur driven limousine.13 
It is often almost as tempting to represent the past as eomic as 
it has been for many historians to make it tragic. But we should 
resist the inclination to homogenise the past into neat processes 
of transition from one phase to the next. Although a scientific 
language of psychopathology becomes more prevalent and 
powerful, especially as it comes to govern the lives of serious 
criminals and those administering criminal justice, popular ideas 
of the monstrous and vengeance continue to circulate to the present 
day. Richard Tithecott, in his fascinating study of the serial killer 
Jeffrey Dahmer, has explored the complex ways in which we are 
both repelled and attracted by stories of 'monsters'. We live in a 
culture that consumes tales of the monstrous human acts, finds 
characters such as Hannibal Lecter engaging. We use such tales, 
Tithecott argues, to explore our ambivalence about civilisation 
and savagery, purity and violence, madness and sanity, masculinity 
and femininity.14 And although much of this modern fascination 
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with serial killers deploys a very old language of the monster as 
evil, relentless, and beyond reason, the scientific still intrudes in 
important ways. Characters such as Jason, in the Friday the 13th 
series, or Michael in the Halloween films, and a host of similar 
figures in popular literature and film, are monsters produced by 
childhood trauma-peer group rejection, scorn from the opposite 
sex, or psycho-sexual fixation arising from moral collapse in 
older generations. In other words there is a reason for their 
behaviour, embedded in social conditions, sexuality or moral 
hypocrisy. Thus monstrosity serves as a means for talking about 
other things than just evil itself. 
But it would also be a mistake to carry this dichotomy of the 
scientific and the popular too far. They are not entirely distinct 
realms but interdependent, mutually reinforcing, overlapping. If 
we return to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when ideas of degeneracy, defectiveness, atavism and moral 
imbecility were emerging as ways of understanding the nature of 
criminality, we can see two competing figures in both the popular 
and the scientific literature. Perhaps distinct is going too far, but 
certainly we can see differences over whether the nature of evil 
was an absence or a presence. Let us go to the popular first-two 
widely read texts of the 1890s: 
[He] is a criminal and of criminal type. Nordau and Lombroso 
would classify him, and qua criminal he is of imperfectly formed 
mind ... his intellect is small and his action is based on selfishness, 
he confines himself to one purpose. That purpose is remorseless. 
(Bram Stoker, Dracula). 
For Bram Stoker, Dracula lacks intelligence, moral development 
and human capacities. Thus he is diminished, reduced to 
remorseless purpose because he has no other possibility. Others 
saw the problem differently: 
He is a man of good birth and excellent education, endowed by 
nature with a phenomenal mathematical faculty ... but the man had 
hereditary tendencies of the most diabolical kind, A criminal strain 
ran in his blood ... he is a genius, a philosopher, an abstract thinker 
(A. Conan Doyle, 'The Final Problem', Memoirs of Sherlock 
Holmes). 
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Sherlock Holmes's foe, Moriarty, clearly has too much of that 
thing so essential to a life well lived-philosophy. 
Similar ideas are evident in scientific literature. Although 
there was a widespread view that the criminal was a degenerate, 
was degeneracy an atavism of savagery, as it was for Lombroso, 
or a failure to develop vital human capacities, as it was for 
Nordau, or was it an overdevelopment, an exaggeration in a 
neuro-psychobiological system that should be in balance, as it 
was for Henry Maudsley? The proliferation of debates about 
these problems in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
propelled the search for ways of identifying the hereditary criminal 
-the degenerate. Anthropometric measurements, fingerprinting 
and mental testing were all in place by 1910 in most western 
jurisdictions. Abnormalities of physique and physiognomy, and 
tests to show that many criminals lacked intelligence, were signs 
eagerly embraced by criminologists. These technologies confirmed 
theories and supported new forms of social intervention. 
But these techniques also threw up problems. The more 
criminals were tested the more obvious it became that there was a 
class of offenders who did not appear to be defective. A minority, 
ten to fifteen percent of English prisoners thought Havelock 
Ellis, showed no sign of degeneracy, mental impairment of 
defectiveness. I5 A small sub-set of this class even demonstrated 
an exceptional intelligence, far exceeding that of ordinary law 
abiding citizens-the Moriarty type. In part this figure of the 
intelligent criminal came out of the empirical research. But it 
might also be said that criminologists expected to find such figures. 
The idea of the criminal whose defect was moral not intellectual 
had a long lineage, stretching back to the 1790s. French alienists, 
such as Esquirol and Pinel, had defined a particular class of the 
insane who suffered 'moral alienation rather than mental 
alienation'. This idea was taken up in 1835 by James Cowles 
Prichard (Senior Physician at the Bristol Infirmary), whose 
influential Treatise on Insanity defined 'moral insanity' as one of 
the four great classes of madness, the others being monomania, 
mania and dementia. Moral insanity was characterised by a 
'morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, 
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temper, habits, moral dispositions and natural impulses without 
any remarkable disorder or defect of the intellect or knowing or 
reasoning faculties' .16 
Moral insanity faded in significance over the course of the 
nineteenth century. It was no'longer one of the great classes of 
madness but it remained an interesting and intriguing category 
for defining a small group of patients. But the emergence of 
criminal anthropology at the end of the nineteenth century 
brought it back to the centre of attention. Moreover the work of 
psychiatrists on the continent, notably Morel in France, Kraepelin 
and Krafft-Ebing in Germany, as well as of doctors in Britain 
such as Maudsley, sustained the idea of a real link between moral 
insanity and vice and crime. The growing passion for eugenics in 
Europe shifted the term to moral imbecility, to resonate with the 
language of mental defectiveness. Moral imbeciles became those 
whose mental functions appeared to be normal but whose moral 
functions were awry, as evidenced by their criminality.l7 
Another term that came into the theoretical literature of 
criminology and psychiatry in the early twentieth century was 
'psychopath'. Again this came largely from the continent, mainly 
Germany, and was carried forth to America by such influential 
psychiatrists as Adolf Meyer. In many respects the psychopath 
and the moral imbecile were one and the same thing-serious 
criminals who had no intellectual or mental defects. They passed 
all the tests, often with great distinction, yet they suffered no 
guilt or remorse over their 'diabolical' acts. And many doctors 
used the terms interchangeably or in different combinations 
with other concepts, when describing the same type of person. 
In the early twentieth century the range and variety of terms 
was intriguing. Havelock Ellis used 'moral imbecile'; but Arthur 
MacDonald, past President of the International Congress on 
Criminal Anthropology, preferred 'moral degenerate'; Charles 
Henderson, Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, 
used 'criminal defective'; L. Forbes Winslow, a prominent English 
alienist actually used 'monomanic' to mean 'moral imbecile'; 
while Albert Wilson used 'psychopath' interchangeably with 
'human degenerate' .18 These were confusing times. 
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Despite the overlap in these terms there do appear to be some 
subtle distinctions worthy of note. By 1908, largely because of 
the impact of the Royal Commission into the Feebleminded, the 
term 'moral imbecile' became the dominant term in Britain. It 
suggested a failure of the moral faculties to develop; a hereditary 
condition, incurable, something that had to be prevented in the 
same way that mental defectiveness had to be controlled. The 
psychopath, however, became the preferred term in America. 
Psychopath conjured up a different genealogy. Here was a defect 
of personal development, something that arose out of childhood 
trauma, poor parenting, peer group pressures, life in city tenements, 
a host of familial, social and psychological factors that were 
definable, traceable and able to be remedied. 19 
The different ways the problem of the psychopath was 
rendered on both sides of the Atlantic, the consequences of these 
differences, and why psychopath eventually triumphed, with 
British psychiatrists and criminologists finally abandoning 'moral 
imbecility' by the late 1930s, is a fascinating story in itself. But 
it is an intricate story more suited to the learned monograph. 
One of the things I am interested in, however, is not so much 
the intellectual history of the psychopath but its presence in the 
everyday: the mundane, routine measures through which such 
concepts governed lives. This moves us from the realm of ideas 
to that of practices, although the two are clearly interconnected. 
III 
One of the things Michel Foucault suggested we do is to ask the 
'how' question, rather than the traditional 'what' and 'why' 
questions. It is instructive to see how things work, how ideas and 
practices are intimately related, mutually reinforcing, and how 
they produce, regulate and discipline bodies, how they provide 
spaces for resistance and even freedom. How particular practices 
made the psychopath is a rather messy story, as these things often 
are. This is in part because the psychopath, at first, was defined 
more by what he or she wasn't than by what they were. Although 
Havelock Ellis and a host of criminologists believed they knew 
73 
the nature of the moral imbecile or psychopath, and the prevalence 
of this condition, the first really sustained investigations of the 
problem in the Anglophone context occurred in New York State. 
In 1913 John D. Rockefeller Jr was anxious to further the study 
of female crime, and funded the Laboratory of Social Hygiene at 
Bedford Hills Reformatory for Women. In 1916 his foundation 
also established the Bureau of Social Hygiene which funded a 
classification clinic at Sing Sing Prison. Through the 1920s and 
1930s similar clinics were established at all the major New York 
penitentiaries. The Laboratory and the Bureau clinics aimed 
to investigate the social and psychological character of inmates. 
It was a teamwork approach. Social workers compiled 
comprehensive social histories of inmates, interviewing friends, 
relatives, employers and welfare organisations. Psychologists 
conducted IQ and personality tests, and psychiatrists interviewed 
and assessed each inmate. The team then met to decide on a 
diagnosis and a treatment regime. 
It is impossible to go into the intricacies of these processes 
here. Elsewhere I have tried to explore the patterns of diagnosis 
through a close reading of the case files. It is arguable that the 
social history rather than the psychiatric interview, contrary to 
expectations and current understandings, determined the 
diagnosis. Certainly the ways in which these different discourses 
shaped understandings of crime had a marked effect on the 
evolution of American criminology between the wars. Influenced, 
as I have said, by the dynamic psychology of Adolf Meyer, in 
the 1930s leading criminologists such as W. I. Thomas and 
Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck focused largely on the development 
of personality within specific social contexts as the origin of 
crimina! behaviour.2o The coming together of the social and the 
psychological fostered the idea of the psychopath as an aberration 
of psychosexual and psychosocial development. But in practice 
the process of fixing the meaning of the psychopath through 
investigation and classification was very banal-perfunctory 
assessments, superficial interviews, impressionistic diagnoses and 
inadequate treatments. More importantly the psychopath appears 
as a very mundane figure. 
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A few examples might suffice to illustrate this point. In 1931 
the psychiatrist at Auburn Prison Classification Clinic found that 
Eugene T 'strived his hardest to create a favourable impression 
and excite sympathy'. But the interviewer concluded that he 
was a 'glib talker', 'erratic' and 'overly emotional', while 'most 
of his story is clearly a figment of his imagination'. These 
impressions, combined with tests indicating normal intelligence, 
shifted the weight of diagnosis decisively towards 'psychopathic 
personality' .21 Michael P, convicted of grand larceny in 1931 
and sentenced to six years in Auburn Penitentiary, had a long 
criminal history. The social history revealed that he had joined a 
local gang as a boy and 'had frequented pool rooms, speakeasies 
and other disreputable places'. He had started drinking at eight 
years, smoking at fourteen and had sex at seventeen. The 
psychiatrist found that Michael's 'story had to be drawn out of 
him piecemeal'; 'he is hiding a great deal of his past life and 
lying at other times'. Thus he concluded that Michael was an 
'irresponsible type, easily led and doesn't appear to appreciate 
the gravity of his offence', and thus that he was a neuropathic-
psychopathic personality.22 
Interviews rarely made sense unless they could be compared 
to an individual social history. Psychiatrists may have suspected 
that an interviewee was lying and evading the issue but they 
needed the evidence of the 'social history' to be really sure. For 
example Gladys G, a 21 year old Jewish girl from a good family, 
according to the mental tests had average intelligence, good critical 
judgement, and sound reasoning capacity. The psychiatric 
interview found her to be good natured, optimistic, cooperative 
and respectful. But the social history told another story. From the 
age of ten she regularly stole money from her parents to buy 
candy for all her school friends. From the age of 14 she forged 
cheques in her father's name at all the major New York department 
stores-including Wannamaker's and Macy's. Her father, a 
respectable Jew and a Mason, made good all these debts for fear 
of his name being sullied. Gladys also had the habit of taking up 
with gullible men of 'slightly inferior mentality', persuading them 
she was an heiress, marrying them and then forging their names 
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on cheques at stores and banks. To her family Gladys was an 
inveterate liar. What psychiatrists did was turn the narrative into 
a medical category. In the case of Gladys, as with many others, 
inveterate liar became constitutional psychopathic inferior, or more 
commonly, a psychopath.23 
The point of these cases is that they illustrate my earlier 
point that the psychopath was an absence, the category to pick 
up all those cases where there was a life of crime but no overt 
psychological or psychiatric impairment. It is also an illustration 
of an all too common phenomenon-the capacity of fashionable 
ideas to sweep away critical judgement. But it was a category 
that became increasingly unsatisfactory. Using these modes of 
diagnosis psychopaths became as much as a quarter of the 
penitentiary population. And despite subsidiary descriptors, such 
as neuropathic or neuro-psychopathic, the psychopath was a rather 
large and undifferentiated category, with little explanatory power 
and no clear diagnostic tests. During the 1930s the category of 
psychopath was beginning to come apart, reflecting, in part, the 
explosion of research into criminality and the politics of 
disciplinarity. Sociologists like E. H. Sutherland began to move 
away from a focus on the offender altogether, to examine social 
processes which produced criminality. Psychiatrists, however, 
sought to go deeper in the psyche. Politicians, law reformers and 
others began to focus on the threat of the sexual psychopath, 
bringing sociologists and psychiatrists together to define this 
category and recommend treatment. Greater scrutiny fostered 
theoretical innovation and the production of new categories such 
as the sociopath, which grounded delinquency in social conditions 
and familial relations. The psychopath gradually became a 
narrower category, or we might see it as two categories. First, the 
sexual psychopath, which some historians have read as code for 
the homosexual, but is clearly something more than this, signifying 
sexual predators, homosexual and heterosexual, particularly those 
who preyed on children. 24 
But the second group is what we have come to know more 
commonly as the psychopath. Here we can see the return of the 
monstrous in scientific form. The psychopath became the category 
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to describe the remorseless sexual and murderous predator, the 
serial killer, who suffered no pangs of guilt and was incapable 
of forming affective relations. The increasing presence of 
psychiatrists in courts, their formal attachment to the judicial 
process, brought them face to face with the monstrous. Horrific 
criminals have existed in many times and places, but in the late 
nincteenth and twentieth centuries doctors were asked to uncover 
the true nature of these 'monsters' , and to arbitrate on their capacity 
to stand trial. Some of the cases are truly horrible. Carl Panzram, 
who was first arrested at 8, murdered 2 I people, committed over 
a thousand indecent assaults and many thousands of robberies, 
and when sentenced to death in 1928 declared that his motto 
in life was 'rob 'em all, rape 'em all and kill 'em all'. Hollywood 
has turned his life into a film. Albert Fish, who may have assaulted 
as many as 400 children, and ate some of his victims, was delighted 
when sentenced to the elcctric chair in 1936, as he saw it as the 
supreme thrill. Our culture is now saturated with narratives of 
these monsters, actual and fictional. 
Psychopath became a means to declare someone mentally 
unbalanced but capable of being punished, disturbed but not 
insane. The crimes were such that criminal justice systems were 
loath to be lenient and psychiatrists in their use of the category 
psychopath eventually found a way to deliberate and punish. 
Psychopaths became a small, elite class of monstrous offenders 
who puzzeled those who sought to understand the nature of serious 
offenders. And while, through profiling, criminolgists have come 
to able to pinpoint signs of psychopathology-characteristics, 
social incidences and paterns-the nature of their 'condition' has 
remained rather elusive. The most serious student of psychopaths 
in the J 9405 and! 950s, Benjamin Karpman, of St Elizabeth's 
Criminal Mental Hospital in Washington DC, eventually sought 
the answer from psychopaths themselves. He developed an 
elaborate form of 'narrative therapy' hoping that by getting his 
patients to write their own story, at considerable length, as most 
of them running to over 300 pages, the texts would unfold the 
precise individual circumstances in which psychopathology 
developed. He published these narratives in four huge, gilt-edged, 
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expensively bound volumes-in size and appearance resembling 
medieval illuminated manuscripts.25 
IV 
The twentieth century has demanded that we engage with the 
problem of mass radical evil, within and across states and polities. 
We will have to do so again in the twenty-first. And we have a 
rich legacy of theoretical debate to tackle this problem. But at the 
level of the everyday, states and professions such as psychiatry 
and criminology deal with the problems of crime and punishment. 
These are important but routine issues, except when something 
out of the ordinary happens. Stories of violent, relentless crimes, 
the acts of so-called 'psychopaths' and serial killers, permeate 
our daily news and popular culture. They are real and imagined. 
But the scientific literature which lays claim to being able to 
understand these offenders seems to have developed hardly at all 
over two centuries. Yes, we have a rich repertoire of signs and 
symptoms for classifying the psychopath, but they remain 
remarkably elusive and mysterious. Modern accounts which 
specify guiltlessness as the essential characteristic of the 
psychopath take us right back to Dracula and Moriarty, perhaps 
even further back to the 'moral insanity' of Prichard and Esquirol. 
The criminology of the psychopath has travelled far, and produced 
much of our present day apparatus for governing crime, but it 
seems to have come back, time and again, to where it began-
with the mystery of the monstrous, the remorseless, relentless 
human and sexual predator, intelligent, or at least single minded, 
cunning and resourceful. 
Despite the forces of rationalisation, modernity, and dis-
enchantment, and despite the emergence of horrendous forms of 
evil embedded in larger forces of modernity, violent, remorseless, 
savage criminals remain mysterious or, at least, trapped in ideas 
and frameworks that are very old. I am not suggesting that we 
should abandon the search for positive knowledge, far from it, as 
empirical research has expanded the knowable and reduced the 
mysterious in very important ways. But I am trying to suggest that 
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there are some things that are largely unfathomable except as 
banality and cliche. Some of these things, such as love and 
friendship, are worthy of celebration, others are darker and infinitely 
more troubling. 
The failure of contemporary theories of the psychopath to 
move us much beyond ideas over two centuries old suggests, to 
me at least, some limits to our capacity to comprehend, something 
that escapes the will to know. It also suggests that, despite 
modernity, the mysterious and unfathomable are still things that 
pervade our culture. What we can know is not so much the nature 
of these things, the what or why of the mysterious, but how it 
works in specific times and places, how unfathomable things work 
within culture and allow us to talk about ourselves in complex 
ways. We might struggle to know evil as a thing in itself, but we 
can make a serious effort to understand some of the ways it has 
shaped our culture and out deeper cultural fears and anxieties. 
Perhaps this is an insight into why I practise history-it is one of 
those things that can free us from the tyranny of the present. 
Notes 
'Sterilization of the Mentally Degenerate', Home Office File, United 
Kingdom Public Record Office, HO 14411 0981197900. 
2 Martin Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law and PoliC\' 
in England, 1830~1914, Cambridge, 1990, pp.215~44. 
3 The historiography on these shifts is vast. For a few representative works 
see Nicole Hahn Rafter, Creating Born Criminals, Urbana, 1997, and 
David Garland, Punishment and Welfare: J\ History of Penal Strategies, 
Aldershot, 1985. 
4 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, London, 
1977. 
5 Again the historiography on these issues is vast. For sornc useful \vorks 
see Daniel J. Kelves, 1n the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of 
Human Heredity, New York, 1985, Matthew Thomson, The Problem ()f 
Mental Deficiency: Eugenics, Democracy, and Social Policy in Britain, 
1 870~/959, Oxford, 1998, and Stephen Garton, 'Sound Minds and 
Healthy Bodies: Reconsidering Eugenics in Australia, 1914~ 1940', 
Australian Historical Studies 26.103 (October, 1994): 163~81. 
6 Often those venturing into print are the ones opposing the idea of 'lethal 
chambers' but in doing so they argue that many prominent citizens 
79 
support the idea. See John C. Goodwin, The Soul of the Criminal, London, 
1924, pp.303-04. 
7 For a useful overview of the impact of Kafka on Arendt see Norma 
Claire Moruzzi, Speaking through the Mask: Hannah Arendt and the 
Politics of Social Identity, Ithaca, 2000, pp.IIS-20. For an insightful 
analysis of the contrasting representations of bureaucracy in Habermas 
and Arendt see Larry May, 'Socialization and Institutional Evil' in Larry 
May and Jerome Kohn, eds, Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1996, pp.S3-106. 
S Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of 
Evil, 2nd edn, New York, 1964. 
9 See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, New 
York, 1947, pp.363-73. 
10 For discussion of the Ripper case and the proliferation oflanguages which 
sought to capture this shadowy figure see Judith Walkowitz, City of 
Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late- Victorian London, 
Chicago, 1992, pp.191-22S. 
II There is an excellent book on Cream; see Angus McClaren, Prescription 
for Murder: The Victorian Serial Killings of Dr Thomas Neill Cream, 
Chicago, 1993. 
12 For Cummins see The Times, June-August 1942. 
13 The Thaw case is reconstructed from articles in the New York Times, 
from 26 June 1906 to February 1905. His escape is covered in the New 
York Times, 17 August 1913. 
14 Richard Tithecott, Of Men and Monsters: Jeffrey Dahmer and the 
Construction of the Serial Killer, Madison, Wis., 1997. 
15 Havelock Ellis, The Criminal, New York, 1972 (first published IS90), 
pp.124-32. 
16 James Cowles Prichard, A Treatise on Insanity, London, IS35, p.6. 
Prichard acknowledges his debt to Esquirol, Pinel, Heinroth and other 
early formulators of the concept. 
17 For a very good account of the evolution of the concept of moral insanity 
and psychopathology see Henry Werlinder, Psychopathy: A History of 
the Concepts, Uppsala, 1978. 
IS See Arthur MacDonald, Criminology, 2nd edn, New York, IS93, pp.l 02-
03; Charles Richmond Henderson, The Cause and Cure of Crime, 
London, 1914, pp.34-35; L. Forbes Winslow, The Insanity of Passion 
and Crime, London, 1916, p.69; Albert Wilson, Unfinished Man: A 
Scientific Analysis of the Psychopath or Human Degenerate, London, 
19\0. 
19 For an assessment of the impact of Meyer and his legacy for American 
psychiatry see Ruth Leys, 'Adolf Meyer: A biographical note' in Ruth 
Leys and Rand B. Davis, eds, Defining American Psychiatry: The 
so 
Correspondence Between Ado/fMever (lnd Edward Bradford Titchen('l", 
Baltimore, 1990, pp.39-57. 
20 Por some useful discussions of this influence see Kathleen W. Jones, 
Taming the Troublesome Child: American Families, Child Guidance 
and the Limits of Psvchiatric Authority, Cambridge, Mass., 1999, and 
Edmund H. Vol kart, ed., Social Behavior and Personality: Contributions 
of W. 1. Thomas to Theory and Social Research, New York, 1951. 
21 Auburn Prison, Classification Clinic Case Files, New York State 
Archives, 14610-77A: B227/3, Box, 4. 
22 Auburn Prison Classification Clinic, Case Files, Box 4. 
23 Bedford Hills Reformatory for Women, Laboratory of Social Hygiene, 
Case Files, C41511, Box 4. 
24 See Estelle B. Freedman, 'Uncontrolled Desires: The Response to the 
Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960', Journal of American History 74 (June, 
1987): 83-106. 
25 Ben Karpman, Case Studies in the Psychopathology of Crime: A 
Reference Source for Research in Criminal Material, 4 vols, Washington 
DC, 1948. 
81 
